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ABOLISHING THE 
"EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR 
OCCURRENCE" THRESHOLD OF 
THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT 
The Price-Anderson Act1 establishes a federal system of pri-
vate insurance, government indemnity, and limited liability for 
the civilian nuclear power industry. Among the Act's provisions 
is a scheme to enhance protection of the public from nuclear ac-
cidents by requiring nuclear plant owners to waive certain de-
fenses they might otherwise have under local tort law.s These 
waiver provisions apply, however, only when the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission determines that the accident exceeds a 
threshold of overall severity described as an "extraordinary nu-
clear occurrence."3 In the one application of the threshold provi-
sion to date, the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission determined that the accident was not an extraordi-
nary nuclear occurrence.• In light of estimated losses of $18 mil-
lion for residents within fifteen miles of the plant,11 the Three 
Mile Island incident calls into question the policies underlying 
the threshold provisions, and illustrates the need for reform. 
This article critically examines the extraordinary nuclear oc-
currence threshold in light of its congressional purpose. Part I 
surveys the Price-Anderson Act's nuclear liability scheme. Part 
II. focuses on the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold, 
scrutinizing its content and its application to the Three Mile Is-
land accident. Part III discusses the need for reform of the nu-
clear liability waiver of defenses scheme, concluding that the 
.threshold should be abolished. 
1 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (cunent version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 
2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1976)). The Act is also known as the Anderson-Price 
Atomic Energy Damages Act and the Atomic Energy Damages Act. 
• 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (1976). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(j), 2210(n) (1976). 
• See notes 53-54 and accompanying text infra. 
• See note 62 and accompanying text infra. 
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I. THE PRICE-ANDERSON AcT 
Prior to 1954, the federal government held an absolute mo-
nopoly on atomic energy development, which was at that time 
an exclusively military endeavor.6 The Atomic Energy Act of 
19547 ended the government monopoly in an attempt to en-
courage the development of atomic energy by private industry 
for electric power generation, under strict regulation by the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).8 The private sector, how-
ever, was unwilling to invest heavily in the new technology, in 
part because of the enormous potential liability it would face 
under traditional tort law in the event of a serious nuclear acci-
dent.9 Concerned that the United States would be overtaken in 
the nuclear race, 1° Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in 
1957.11 
A. Protecting the Nuclear Industry: Limitations on Licensee 
Liability 
The Price-Anderson Act has two principal goals: protection of 
the public by assuring the availability of funds to satisfy acci-
dent claims, and protection of the nuclear industry by removing 
the threat of tremendous potential liability.12 Most of the provi-
• Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, §§ 1, 6, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42 
u.s.c. §§ 2011, 2121 (1976)). 
7 Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1976)). 
• The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976), transferred 
the regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission to a new Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC). Throughout this article, "Commission" refers to whichever of the 
two agencies was in existence at the time referred to. 
• E.g., Governmental Indemnity: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy 
on Governmental Indemnity for Private Licensees and AEC Contractors Against Re-
actor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1956) (testimony of Lewis L. Strauss). 
10 Senator Clinton Anderson, cosponsor with Representative Melvin Price of the 
Price-Anderson Act and Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, expressed 
concern about "significant progress" in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France. 102 
CONG. REC. 7787 (1956) (remarks of Senator Anderson). 
11 Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2039, 2073, 
2210, 2232, 2239 (1976)). 
11 See S. REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1966) U.S. ConE CoNG. & 
An. NEWS 3201, 3206 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1605). 
However, one commentator concluded from the legislative history of the original Price-
Anderson Act: "Clearly, the enactment of the indemnity legislation was in response to 
direct pressure from private industry for an indirect subsidy in the form of protection 
against possible bankruptcy." Note, The "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence" Thresh-
old and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6 RUTGERS CAMDEN L.J. 
360, 379 (1974). See also Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 
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sions of the original Act were directed towards the latter goal, 
emphasizing the role of private insurers with government acting 
as a back-up. The Act, for example, requires operators of pro-
duction size reactors to obtain the maximum amount of insur-
ance available from private sources to cover public liability.18 It 
further provides that should public liability from an accident ex-
ceed the amount of private insurance coverage, the AEC would 
indemnify the licensee for an additional amount of $500 mil-
lion. 14 Another controversial provision of the original Act limits 
the aggregate liability for a single nuclear accident to $560 
million.111 
When Congress extended the Price-Anderson Act for a third 
ten-year period in 1975,16 it added a third layer of liability pro-
tection, designed to come into play after the private insurance is 
exhausted, but before the liability of the federal government is 
invoked. In the event of an accident at any licensed facility for 
MICH. L. REV. 479, 499-501 (1973). 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976). The private insurance industry organized into two nu-
clear liability insurance pools. At the time the Price-Anderson bill was enacted the pools 
agreed to provide coverage of $60 million for liability to the public from a single nuclear 
accident. That amount has increased over the years to a present level of $160 million. 10 
C.F.R. § 140.ll(a)(4) (1980). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1976). 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976). The limitation engendered a great deal of controversy 
because of claims that the release of radioactivity from a "worst case" accident could 
cause damage to the public many times greater than the liability limit. The most recent 
study estimated the average consequences of the worst category of accident examined 
would be 3,300 fatalities and 45,000 radiation injuries within one year, 45,000 delayed 
cancer fatalities, 240,000 delayed thyroid injuries, 5,100 inherited disorders in offspring 
of the irradiated population, and property damage of $14 billion. NRC, REACTOR SAFETY 
STUDY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
83 (WASH-1400) (NUREG 75/014) (1975). These casualty figures and the Reactor 
Safety Study as a whole have been severely criticized as understating the true potential 
consequences of serious accidents. See, e.g., sources cited in Note, Nuclear Power and 
the Price-Anderson Act: Promotion Over Public Protection, 30 STAN. L. REV. 393, 431-38 
(1978). In response to this criticism and an internal review, the NRC formally repudiated 
the Executive Summary of the Reactor Safety Study and acknowledged its methodology 
and peer review procedure as inadequate. OFFICE OF PUB. AFF., NRC, NEWS RELEAsB 79-
19, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISSUES POLICY STATEMENT ON REACTOR SAFETY 
STUDY AND REVIEW BY LEWIS PANEL(1979). 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act's liability limit in Duke 
Power Company v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See 
note 89 infra. 
18 Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 4, 89 Stat. 1111. 
Congress originally contemplated the Act as a temporary, ten-year measure to enable 
the private insurance industry to accumulate experience concerning nuclear risks. S. REP. 
No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Seas. 9, reprinted in [1957) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1803, 
1811. Congress, however, has twice extended the Act for additional ten-year periods, 
most recently until 1987. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855; Act of 
Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 4, 89 Stat. 1111. 
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which public liability exceeds the amount of private insurance 
available,17 a retrospective rating plan assesses deferred premi-
ums of $2-5 million per reactor on all licensees in the country.18 
Thus, every reactor operator in the country can be liable for up 
to $q million for an accident at any plant. Imposing this liability 
on the industry displaces the liability of the federal government 
under its indemnification agreements, and eventually will in-
crease the aggregate compensation above the $560 million level 
as more reactors are commissioned.19 The amendments also pro-
vide for government assurance of the deferred premium funds in 
case any licensees are unable to pay them promptly for any 
reason.20 
B. Protecting the Public: The Waiver of Def ens es Provisions 
Hearings held by the congressional Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy in 1965 identified two potentially significant 
sources of legal uncertainty in case of reactor accidents: (1) the 
standard of liability; and (2) whether the applicable state statute 
of limitations would cut off claims of radiation-injured claimants 
without allowance for the long latency periods of most radiation 
injuries.21 In 1966, the Joint Committee held hearings to probe 
the extent of these problems,22 and subsequently reported a 
bill28 which Congress enacted that same year." After considering 
a variety of other statutory solutions,211 Congress adopted a se-
17 The amount of private insurance available from the pools has gradually increased 
over the years to a present level of $160 million. See 10 C.F.R. § 140.ll(a)(4) (1980). 
1
• 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976). 
•• If the amount of private insurance available remains at the present $160 million 
level, government indemnity will be eliminated completely when there are 80 licensed 
reactors (80 X $5 million = $400 million industry liability + $160 million private insur-
ance = $560 million aggregate compensation). Thereafter, each additional license will 
add $5 million to the aggregate compensation fund. 
•
0 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976). 
u See H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-9, 13 (1965). 
n Proposed Amendments to Price-Anderson Act Relating to Waiver of Defenses: 
Hearings on H.R. 15913 and S. 3548 Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as Waiver Hearings]. 
n H.R. REP. No. 2043, 89TH CoNG., 2D SESs. (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 
2043); S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 12. 
,.. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2014, 2139, 2210 (1976)). 
sa For example, the Joint Committee considered and rejected the idea of enacting a 
new body of federal tort law because of perceived difficulties of administration and 
strong opposition from the nuclear and insurance industries. H.R. REP. No. 2043, supra 
note 23, at 8-10. 
Torts scholars generally believed that the doctrine of strict liability should be uni-
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ries of provisions requiring nuclear energy producers to waive 
various defenses otherwise available under state law.28 
Subsection . (i) of the waiver provisions requires licensees to 
waive the defenses· of lack of negligence, contributory or compar-
ative negligence, and assumption of risk. This provision accom-
plishes a result similar to a rule of strict liability, even in juris-
dictions which do not recognize that doctrine or would not apply 
it to operation of a nuclear plant. n 
Subsection (iii) requires licensees to waive any defense based 
on state statutes of limitation, as long as claims are filed within 
three years of discovery of injury and within twenty years of the 
nuclear accident.18 This provision protects claimants for up to 
twenty years against having their suits barred by statutes of lim-
itation in jurisdictions which hold that a cause of action accrues 
formly applied in the event of a nuclear accident. Dean Prosser has noted, for example: 
[T]he first case raising the question as to the use of nuclear energy has yet to 
reach the courts. When it does, it may be predicted with a good deal of confi-
dence that this is an area in which no court will, at last, refuse to recognize and 
apply the principle of strict liability. . . . 
w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW OP TORTS§ 78, at 516 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omit-
ted). See also Seavey, Torts and Atoms, 46 CAL. L. REV. 3, 8-10 (1958). But see, E. 
STASON, s. ESTEP & w. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 676-77, 723 (1959). Application of 
the doctrine would relieve claimants of the need to prove the defendant was at fault. 
Such proof is difficult in the context of a nuclear accident because the conduct of the 
plant operator is generally not visible to potential claimants and much evidence might be 
destroyed or rendered unavailable for many years. H.R. REP. No. 2043, supra note 23, at 
7. 
However, the Committee perceived that the issue of whether strict liability would be 
applied could be a source of legal uncertainty and disparate treatment of claimants, be-
cause only a few states had adopted the strict liability doctrine in 1965 while several had 
explicitly rejected it. Even in those jurisdictions which had accepted the doctrine, it was 
uncertain whether it would be applied to the nuclear power industry. Id. 
" See note 24 supra. The amendments authorize the AEC (NRC) to require that both 
indemnity agreements with licensees and private insurance policies include waivers of: 
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of claimant or fault of persons indemnified, 
(ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or government immunity, and 
(iii) any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is instituted 
within three years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably 
could have known, of his injury ... and the cause thereof, but in no event more 
than twenty years after the date of the nuclear incident. 
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1976). 
Subsection (ii), not discussed ~ the text, is designed to benefit victims of incidents at 
nuclear research facilities of puffl'ic universities or at government nuclear installations. 
" By requiring waivers of contributory or comparative negligence and assumption of 
risk, the provision actually goes somewhat beyond traditional strict liability, which some-
times allows those defenses. See W. PROSSER, supra note 25, § 79, at 522-24. On the 
other hand, the waivers expressly do not apply to a defense based on plaintiff's failure to 
take reasonable steps to mitigate damages or plaintiff's intentional acts causing his in-
jury or wrongfully causing the nuclear incident. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1976). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1976). A 1975 amendment extended the cutoff period from 
ten to twenty years. Id. 
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at the time of the wrongful act of the defendant. 19 However, it 
does not limit claims in jurisdictions with more liberal statutes 
of limitations, such as those which have adopted the discovery 
rule, 80 since in such situations the defendant will not yet have 
any defense to waive. 
A handful of other provisions also attempt to enhance the 
public protection element of the Price-Anderson Act. A provi-
sion added by the 1966 amendments authorizes the Commission 
to "enter into agreements with other indemnitors to establish 
coordinated procedures for the prompt handling, investigation, 
and settlement of claims for public liability."81 This provision 
authorizes the Commission or private insurers to make prompt 
payments to claimants without securing releases "for the pur-
pose of providing immediate assistance following a nuclear inci-
dent."81 Another provision establishes a scheme for federal court 
apportionment of the compensation fund if it appears that pub-
lic liability from a single nuclear incident may exceed the $560 
million liability limit.88 
n A 1965 study of state statutes of limitations revealed that in the majority of states, 
the cause of action accrued at the time of the wrongful act of the defendant, without 
regard to whether or not the claimant knew or could reasonably know of his or her in-
jury. See Edward J. Bloustein, The Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Common Law 
Recovery for Radiation Injuries, reprinted in Waiver Hearings, supra note 23, at 218, 
222. 
Many radiation injuries have long latency periods which do not manifest themselves 
for as long as twenty or thirty years. In states which adhere to the "time of the wrongful 
act" rule, the latent radiation injury claims of nuclear accident victims would probably 
be barred by the statute of limitations, because in most states claims must be filed 
within three years of the accrual of the cause of action. Id. at 219-20. 
80 In 1965, a small minority of the states adhered to the "discovery rule," under which 
a cause of action for personal injury accrued when the claimant first knew, or reasonably 
could have known, of his or her injury and its cause. Id. at 223. The "discovery" rule is 
particularly well suited to radiation injuries since it accounts more fairly for the problem 
of knowing whether or not one is injured before the manifestations appear. 31 ALA. L. 
REv. 509, 513 (1980) (discusses a recent Alabama Supreme Court decision, Garrett v. 
Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979), refusing to apply the discovery rule and thus 
barring a radiation injury claim on the basis of a one-year statute of limitations). Al-
though more states now adhere to the discovery rule, see, e.g., Louisville Trust Co. v. 
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
117 N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. 1974), a few 
states persist in applying the "time-of-the-wrongful-act" rule. See, e.g., Garrett v. Ray-
theon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979); Thornton v. Roosevelt Hospital, 47 N.Y.2d 780, 
391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). See also Birnbaum, Statutes of Limitations 
in Environmental Suits: The Discovery Rule Approach, TluAL, April 1980, at 38. 
81 42 U.S.C. § 2210(m) (1976). 
u Id. 
u Id. § 2210(0). If the federal district court in the district where the accident occurs 
determines, upon the petition of any interested party, that the liability limit might be 
exceeded, the court must approve any indemnity payments in excess of fifteen percent of 
the liability limit. Id. § 2210(0)(1). In addition, the Commission shall, and any other 
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The 1966 amendments also granted original jurisdiction to the 
federal district court of the district where the accident occurred 
for public liability claims arising from an extraordinary nuclear 
occurrence.34 Finally, the 1975 amendments directed CongreBB to 
thoroughly review any nuclear incident causing damage in excess 
of the applicable liability limit.311 
II. THE TRIGGER TO WAIVER: THE EXTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR 
OCCURRENCE THRESHOLD 
A. The Threshold Defined 
The modifications of tort law described in the preceding sec-
tion do not apply to all "nuclear incidents."88 The Price-Ander-
son Act provides that the waivers are to come into effect only for 
those serious nuclear incidents which the Commission character-
izes as "extraordinary nuclear occurrences."87 An extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence is defined as "any event causing a discharge 
or dispersal . . . of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material 
. . . or causing radiation levels offsite, which the Commission 
determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial 
damages to persons offsite or property offsite."88 The Commis-
sion's determination is not reviewable by any agency or court. 89 
Congress directs the NRC to establish written criteria further 
defining the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold;'° The 
Commission's extraordinary nuclear occurrence regulations41 
interested party may, submit to the court a plan for the appropriate disposition of the 
remaining funds, including withholding of a portion thereof for possible latent injury 
claims which may not be discovered until a later time. Id. § 2210(0)(3). 
14 Id. § 2210(n)(2). 
111 Id. § 2210(e). This provision was enacted in response to the criticism that victims of 
a "worst case" accident might be compensated at a rate of only a few cents per dollar of 
losses as a result of the liability limit. This amendment is a congressional promise to at 
least consider providing additional compensation on an ad hoc basis. For the view that 
this provision adds no substantive protection for nuclear accident victims, see Note, 
supra note 15, at 408-09 . 
.. The Act defines "nuclear incident" as "any occurrence ... causing ... bodily in-
jury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of prop-
erty, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous 
properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material." 42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1976). 
17 Id. § 2210(n). 
11 Id. § 2014(j) . 
.. Id. 
'
0 Id. 
" 10 C.F.R. §§ 140.81-.85 (1980). 
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provide a two-part test for the threshold. The first criterion is 
satisfied if one or more persons were, could have been, or might 
be exposed to a specified dosage of radiatfon per critical organ or 
if a specified amount of radiation has contaminated offsite prop-
erty. '2 If the Commission determines that either component of 
the first test is met, then it will consider the second test: 
whether the event has resulted or will probably result in sub-
stantial damages to persons or property offsite.'8 The meaning 
of "damage" under the regulations is restricted to losses result-
ing from the hazardous properties of radioactive materials or 
from protective actions to avoid exposure thereto." 
.. The first criterion states: 
The Commission will determine that there has been a substantial discharge or 
dispersal of radioactive material offsite, or that there have been substantial 
levels of radiation offsite, when . . . radioactive material is released from its in-
tended place of confinement or radiation levels .occur offsite and either of the 
following findings are also made: 
(a) The Commission finds that one or more persons offsite were, could have 
been, or might be exposed to radiation or to radioactive material, resulting in a 
dose or in a projected dose in excess of one of the levels in [a specified] 
table .... 
(b) The Commission finds that-
(1) Surface contamination of ... any 100 square meters of offsite property 
has occurred as the result of a release of radioactive material from a production 
or utilization facility and such contamination is characterized by levels of radia-
tion in excess of the values listed in [another specified table], or 
(2) Surface contamination of any offsite. property has occurred as the result of 
a release of radioactive material in the course of transportation and such con-
tamination is characterized by levels of radiation in excess of one of the values 
listed in [the second specified table]. 
Id. § 140.84. 
•• A positive determination will be made if any of the following are established: 
(1) ... the death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five· or 
more people located offsite showing objective clinical evidence of physical injury 
from exposure to the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties 
of [nuclear] materials; or 
(2) . . . $2,500,000 or more of damage offsite ... sustained by any one person, 
or $5 million or more . . . damage in the aggregate; or 
(3) . . . $5000 or more ... damage offsite ... sustained by each of 50 or more 
persons, provided that $1 million or more . . . damage in the aggregate has been 
or will probably be sustained. . . . 
Id. § 140.85(a). 
" The regulations define damage as 
that arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other 
hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material and shall 
be based upon estimates of one or more of the following: 
(1) Total cost necessary to put affected property back into use, 
(2) Loss of use of affected property, 
(3) Value of affected property where not practical to restore to use, 
(4) Financial loss resulting from protective actions appropriate to reduce or 
avoid exposure to radiation or to radioactive materials. 
Id. § 140.85(b). 
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The legislative history of the waiver provisions reveals two ra-
tionales which were offered for the threshold. The first, and 
more important of these was fear that application of the waivers 
to all "nuclear incidents" would encourage "nuisance" suits. 
This was the rationale offered by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy'11 and the one most often mentioned by support-
ers of the threshold during hearings.'-8· 
The second rationale offered for the threshold was· that limit-
•• The Senate Report on the amendments states that inclusion of the concept 
stems in major part from the desire of industry to preserve its customary legal 
defenses in situations where nothing untoward or unusual has occurred in the 
conduct of nuclear activities. . . . 
[T]here is no pressing need to invoke . . . the special waivers in situations 
which are not exceptional and which can well be taken care of by the traditional 
system of tort law .... For this reason, and for the additional purpose of help-
ing to assure that the waiver system will not be invoked in case of nuisance suits, 
the Committee believes that a reasonable threshhold should be satisfied before 
the special waiver provisions . . . become operative. 
S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 12, at 11. 
•• E.g., Waiver Hearings, supra note 23, at 23 (statement of Joseph F. Hennessey) ("it 
would cause considerable concern to the insurers . . . if the nuisance suit were permitted 
to have the advantages of the waiver of these defenses"). 
Mr. Hennessey, General Counsel of the AEC, later testified: 
[T]he insurance companies have ... accumulated some dread of the nuisance 
claim and the fake claim, and the purpose of establishing a threshhold is to elim-
inate from this system the occasion where a few people in the neighborhood of a 
nuclear power plant who contract diseases, or may think they have, will assert 
claims against the utility .... 
. . . The purpose is to take care of the situation where you have a small num-
ber of nuisance claims and not give those people the advantage of the waiver of 
defenses. · 
I think apart from that reason I know of no other for setting up this spe-
cially defined term, "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." 
Id. at 78 (emphasis added). 
An attorney for a prominent nuclear utility testified: "[l]t is very significant that the 
waivers be limited to extraordinary nuclear occurrences. In the absence of this it would 
be an invitation for nuisance suits .... " Id. at 50 (statement of Arthur Gehr). 
Similarly, a representative of the nuclear insurance pools which provide the private 
coverage stated: "The minor incident, the nuisance claim, are all claims if possible which 
should be kept from this regime." Id. at 122 (testimony of DeRoy C. Thomas). 
Two members of the staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy likewise identi-
fied the desire to exclude nuisance suits as the major reason for the threshold in an 
article about the waiver legislation. They wrote: 
The inclusion of the concept ... stemmed in major part from the desire of in-
dustry to preserve its customary legal defenses in situations where nothing unto-
ward or unusual has occurred. . . . The desire of industry to retain its defenses 
is grounded on the fear that victims of diseases such as cancer-which may be 
caused by, among other things, ionizing radiation-who live in the vicinity of 
reactors might charge that their infirmities were caused by the tiny amounts of 
radioactive gases which the AEC has determined may be emitted from a reac-
tor's stack without endangering the public health and safety. 
Trosten & England, Waiving Defenses: A New Approach to Protecting the Public 
Against Financial Loss from Use of Atomic Energy, 27 FED. B.J. 27, 46 (1967). 
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ing the waivers to only serious accidents is consistent with the 
Act's purpose of protecting the public from the consequences of 
catastrophic nuclear accidents.47 Although the waivers would ap-
ply to less-than-catastrophic accidents, Congress chose to re-
quire "substantial" radiation releases and damages as a trigger 
to the waiver scheme.48 Congress, however, decided not to define 
"substantial" statutorily because of "the difficulty of fixing a 
definition which would be suitable for a wide variety of circum-
stances," and instead authorized the Commission to develop a 
suitable definition.49 
B. The Threshold in Practice: Three Mile Island as a Non-
Extraordinary Occurrence 
The waiver of defenses scheme created by the Price-Anderson 
Act constitutes a significant start toward improving the public 
protection component of the overall federal nuclear accident lia-
bility scheme.60 A puzzling problem is why the application of 
these useful liberalizations of tort law should be afforded only to 
victims of very serious accidents, leaving victims of lesser acci-
dents to cope with the very vicissitudes of state tort law which 
the waiver of defenses provisions were designed to avoid. 
The inadequacy of the threshold requirement became quite 
apparent in its only application to date, the notorious accident 
at Three Mile Island. In the spring of 1979, the most serious 
accident in the history of civilian nuclear power occurred at Unit 
2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.61 The Three 
Mile Island (TMI) accident clearly satisfied the qualitative 
norms of the regulations. By virtually any standard, "something 
exceptional" occurred; the incident was "untoward and unex-
pected."62 Nevertheless, the NRC's final determination in April, 
1980, was that the TMI accident did not constitute an extraordi-
nary nuclear occurrence under the quantitative requirements of 
" S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 12, at 11. 
•• See 42 U.S. § 2014(j) (1976); S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 12, at 10-11. 
•• S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 12, at 12. 
"" For the view that the waivers do not substantially benefit nuclear accident victims 
because most of the defenses waived could not be successfully asserted under prevailing 
rules of law, see Note, supra note 15, at 410-18. 
•
1 Three Mile Island is a two-unit nuclear facility operated by the Metropolitan 
Edison Co. near Middletown, Pennsylvania. See generally 1 SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP, 
NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND, A REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONERS AND TO THE PUBLIC 1-4, 
(Mitchell Rogovin, Director, 1980) [hereinafter cited as RoGOVIN REPORT]. 
•• 10 C.F.R. § 140.81(b)(3) (1980). 
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its regulations.118 Although conceding that "in ordinary parlance" 
the accident was "extraordinary," the Commission nonetheless 
found that the radiological releases did not rise to the levels re-
quired for an extraordinary nuclear occurrence under its 
regulations.114 
A survey of some of the undisputed events and consequences 
of the TMI accident illustrates the gross discrepancy between 
the articulated purpose of the threshold and the result of its ap-
plication in practice. The incident had all the earmarks of disas-
ter. Two days into the accident, because of uncertainty concern-
ing the possibility of uncontrolled radiation release, the 
Governor of Pennsylvania advised pregnant women and pre-
school age children within five miles of TMI to leave the area.1111 
Ninety-three percent of that group complied with the advice.116 
Officials of the NRC, the utility, and the state government con-
sidered immediate major evacuation of the area several times 
during the accident.117 At one point, a county official· announced 
over a local radio station that evacuation was imminent.118 Al-
though no official, general evacuation was ordered, approxi-
mately 144,000 people, 39 percent of those living within 15 miles 
of the plant, voluntarily left the region.119 
A survey commissioned by the NRC estimated that within 15 
miles of the plant, 34,000 evacuees lost 141,000 person-days of 
work.80 Of those who lost work, 19,000 also lost pay.81 If approxi-
mately $1.2 million of already paid insurance compensation is 
subtracted from income loss and accident-related expenses, 
short term, uncompensated losses borne by households within 15 
miles of TMI as of August 10, 1979, were about $18 million, of 
.,. Metropolitan Edison Co., 11 N.R.C. 519 (1980). This determination is not review-
able before any tribunal. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1976). One commentator has suggested that 
the provision eliminating judicial review might be unconstitutional. See Note, supra note 
15, at 428. 
.. 11 N.R.C. at 522. See also OFFICE FOR THE EXEC. Ora. FOR OPERATIONS, NRC, RE-
PORT TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FROM THE STAFF PANEL ON THE COMMIS-
SION'S DETERMINATION OF AN ExTRAORDINARY NUCLEAR OCCURRENCE (ENO) (NUREG-
0637) (1980) [hereinafter cited as STAFF ENO REPORT]. 
06 2 RoGOVIN REPORT, supra note 51, at 1013-14. The Governor did not officially lift 
the evacuation advisory for ten days. Id. at 1016 . 
.. Id. 
•• Id. at 1010-14. 
08 Id. at 1012. 
"" Id. at 1016. The median length of time evacuees remained out of the area was five 
days. They traveled an average distance of 100 miles. Id. 
00 Id. at 633. 
11 The median pay loss for this group was $110; the mean loss was $271. Eleven per-
cent reported losing more than $500. Id. 
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which total evacuation costs represented some $8.8 million.82 To-
tal income losses of evacuees and nonevacuees were estimated to 
be $9.3 million.83 
Despite the compelling evidence of substantial adverse conse-
quences to the public, the TMI accident failed to satisfy the 
NRC criteria for offsite radiation doses to humans or radioactive 
contamination of property and, therefore, was not an extraordi-
nary nuclear occurrence. Even if the radiation level require-
ments had been met, however, it is not clear that the TMI acci-
dent would have satisfied the damage requirements84 because of 
the narrow conception of damage implicit in the threshold con-
cept, and made explicit in the regulations. 811 
The extraordinary nuclear occurrence criteria contemplate 
only damages which are the direct consequence of actual physi-
cal exposure to nuclear materials or the avoidance thereof.88 The 
TMI experience demonstrates graphically that nuclear accidents 
can result in substantial losses without exposure to high levels of 
radiation. Besides the economic costs already mentioned, the 
TMI victims suffered a variety of health-related harms.87 Psy-
chological distress, for example, said to be the most significant 
health effect of the accident, remained high in the area around 
TMI for many months after the height of the accident. 88 The 
costs borne by the victims of TMl89 were not caused by exposure 
to radiation, but they were no less "caused" by the accident 
than if they had resulted from actual radiation exposure. Appre-
hension, and the expenses it engenders,. are unavoidable costs of 
a nuclear accident. Nevertheless, the losses of TMI victims may 
•• Id. at 635. It is noteworthy that the $18 million figure does not include any of the 
more controversial alleged damages from TMI such as reduction of property values, psy-
chological distress, or slightly enhanced probability of disease in the future. It also does 
not include the losses of the much larger number of people outside the 15-mile radius 
who were adversely affected by the accident. 
•• Id. at 638 . 
.. 10 C.F.R. § 140.85(a) (1980); see note 43 and accompanying text supra. 
811 See STAFF ENO REPORT, supra note 54, at 30 . 
.. 10 C.F.R. § 140.85(b) (1980); see note 44 and accompanying text supra. 
87 By most assessments the release of radioactivity at TMI will probably not result in 
any statistically noticeable public health effects other than psychological distress. 2 
RoGOVIN REPORT, supra note 51, at 407-08. This is not to deny, however, that some addi-
tional individuals may contract cancer who would not have done so in the absence of the 
accident. It is only to say that the number of such individuals will not be great enough to 
be noticed statistically among the population at risk. The Rogovin Report concluded 
from several studies that the maximum offsite does to any individual was less than 100 
millirems, and that the expected additional incidence of death from cancer would be less 
than one. Id . 
.. Id. at 630-33. 
" See note 62 and accompanying text supra. 
SPRING 1981) Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence 621 
not fall within the categories of damage enumerated in the regu-
lations; it is not clear that the voluntary TMI evacuations would 
be considered "appropriate" actions to reduce or avoid exposure 
to radiation. 70 
The failure of the NRC to declare TMI an extraordinary nu-
clear occurrence may not preclude the victims from obtaining 
relief. The TMI victims have already negotiated an extensive 
settlement,71 and Pennsylvania tort law is relatively favorable to 
the type of claims TMI plaintiffs would be likely to bring, with 
or without the Price-Anderson waivers of defenses.71 The ex-
traordinary nuclear occurrence requirement has significant po-
tential for mischief nonetheless. 
Consider, for example, a hypothetical accident involving a 
substantial release of radiation occurring at the Browns Ferry 
Nuclear Generating Plant near Decatur, Alabama.78 In such an 
•
0 See 10 C.F.R. § 140.85(b)(4) (1980); STAFF ENO REPoRT, supra note 54, at 34. 
71 The proposed settlement, however, provides mainly for economic losses, with only 
20 percent of the funds going into a "public health fund." See Nat'l L.J., March 9, 1981, 
at 9, col. 1. 
•• Pennsylvania courts have adopted the doctrine of strict liability for "abnormally 
dangerous activities" set forth in section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
Federo1f v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817 (1949). There is reason 
to believe that a state which accepts the doctrine will apply it to opeation of a nuclear 
plant. See note 25 supra. Even if courts applying Pennsylvania law do not apply strict 
liability in this context, TMI claimants' causes of action should not be impossible to 
maintain because there is ample documented evidence of negligence in the TMI acci-
dent. See generally, RoGOVIN REPORT, supra note 51. Thus, the Act's waiver of defenses 
as to fault is apparently not critical to TMI claimants. 
Furthermore, Pennsylvania has recognized the "discovery rule" with respect statutes 
of limitations, holding that where knowledge of injury is impossible because of the laws 
of nature, the statute should begin to run from the time of discovery of the injury. See 
Med-Mar, Inc., v. Dilworth, 214 Pa. Super. 402, 257 A.2d 910 (1969). 
The TMI plainti1fs should also fare adequately well without the special jurisdictional 
provision of the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1976). A recent memoran-
dum decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(involving the largest consolidated class action suit arising from the TMI accident), held 
that although the NRC had determined that the TMI accident was not an extraordinary 
nuclear occurrence, federal jurisdiction was present under the statute granting district 
courts original jurisdiction of any civil action "arising under any Act of Congress regulat-
ing commerce," 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. III 1979). In re Three Mile Island Litigation, 87 
F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 
The jurisdictional issue might yet haunt claimants if their cases were appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court. The Court has not been eager to find implied private 
rights of action "arising under" federal statutes in recent years, see Transamerica Mort-
gage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 
U.S. 450 (1979), and might well disagree with the district court's holding on that issue. 
•• The example is not far-fetched. The Browns Ferry Plant did have a very serious 
accident in 1975. A worker with a candle accidentally started a control cable fire which 
burned for seven hours and rendered some of the plant's safety systems inoperative. A 
makeshift reactor cooling system was quickly devised which averted a meltdown, but 
"there are experts who believe that Browns Ferry was as close as a few hours away from 
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event, a victim's radiation injury claim might well be barred by 
the Alabama statute of limitation even before the NRC deter-
mined whether the accident was an extraordinary nuclear occur-
rence.'" If the determination was negative (the accident did not 
satisfy the threshold), the victim would be without a remedy no 
matter how serious the injury or how meritorious the claim. If 
the accident did satisfy the threshold, the Act's waiver scheme 
preserves the victim's cause of action, but only for twenty 
years. 76 If the victim contracts cancer during that period, she 
must prove that her cancer was caused by the radiation she re-
ceived from the accident in order to recover - a virtually im-
possible undertaking unless many of her neighbors are similarly 
afflicted. 76 If her cancer is not diagnosed until more than twenty 
years after the accident, she is once again without remedy, even 
if she can prove the accident was the cause. 
The above example demonstrates some of the deleterious ef-
fects of the threshold that might be expected under circum-
stances less fortuitous than in the TMI case. The Alabama stat-
ute of limitations yields precisely the kind of harsh result which 
the waivers were supposed to remedy, yet the threshold denies 
that relief on the basis of a classification unrelated to the merit 
of the claim. The classification is both overinclusive, in that it 
denies benefits of the waivers to meritorious claims, and under-
inclusive, in that it affords the waivers to spurious claims arising 
from more serious accidents. As the Alabama example shows, 
the threshold contravenes the congressional purpose of improv-
ing protection of the public by potentially denying that protec-
tion in exactly the kind of situation in which it is most needed. 
an accident that would have released radioactivity to the public." R. NADER & J. As-
BOTI'S, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 96 (1977). 
" In the TMI case, more than a year elapsed between the beginning of the accident 
and the NRC's determination that it was not an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The 
Alabama statute of limitations for such radiation injury claims is one year, beginning at 
the time of the exposure. Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516 (Ala. 1979); Au.. CODE 
§ 6-2-39(a)(5) (1979). The Alabama statute was recently amended so that a victim can 
bring a product liability claim, including damages from latent radiation injuries not "re-
sulting from a sudden and fortuitous trauma," against the original seller within one year 
of its discovery by reasonable diligence. See, id. § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1980). However the 
action must still be brought within ten years from the date the product was put into use 
or required to be repaired by a governmental agency. Id. See also 31 ALA. L. REv. 509 
(1980). 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(l) (1976). 
•• See text accompanying note 97 infra. 
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III. ABOLISHING THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT 
A. Administrative Reform 
The Three Mile Island experience highlights the need for re-
form of the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold. Applica-
. tion of the threshold to the Three Mile Island incident revealed 
a number of serious flaws in the current statutory scheme, a cen-
tral flaw being the lack of "fit" between the Commission's quali-
tative and quantitative standards. The current conceptual 
framework might be tolerable if the threshold were set low 
enough to exclude only truly inconsequential "incidents." But 
the radiation doses required by the first test of AEC criteria77 
are very high - in one instance higher by a factor of 200 than 
the legally permissible dose to an offsite individual.78 Although 
the regulations state that the test is designed to assure that 
something "exceptional" and "untoward and unexpected" has 
occurred, 79 the Three Mile Island incident illustrates that the 
quantitave regulations do not correspond to this goal. 
The problems presented by the extraordinary nuclear occur-
rence requirement could be mitigated by changing the substan-
tive definition of the threshold. The Public Citizen Litigation 
Group and the Critical Mass Energy Project have filed a petition 
for rulemaking with the NRC asking the Commission to alter or 
amend the extraordinary nuclear occurrence criteria to bring 
them more into line with the intent of Congress. 80 The petition 
71 10 C.F.R. § 140.84 (1980). See note 42 and accompanying text supra. 
71 NRC Standards for Protection Against Radiation require that: 
no licensee shall possess, use or transfer licensed material in such a manner as to 
create in any unrestricted area from radioactive material and other sources of 
radiation in his poaseBBion: 
(1) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in the 
area, could result in his receiving a dose in exceBB of two millirems in any one 
hour, or 
(2) Radiation levels which, if an individual were continuously present in the 
area, could result in his receiving a dose in exceBB of 100 millirems in any seven 
consecutive days. 
10 C.F.R. § 20.105(b) (1980). 
In other words, 100 millirems, or 0.1 rem, is the maximum dose to which a licensee 
may expose an individual at its site _boundary during any seven-day period without vio-
lating the law. By comparison, in order to satisfy the first part of the extraordinary nu-
clear occurrence threshold, some off'site individual must receive a whole body dose of 20 
rems (without time limit). 10 C.F.R. § 140.84 (1980). The threshold is higher by a factor 
of 200 than the radiation limit for legal operation of the plant. 
" 10 C.F.R. § 140.8l(b)(3) (1980). 
00 44 Fed. Reg. 50,419 (1979). 
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as~erts that the Commission has the discretion to define ex-
traordinary nuclear occurrence in a way that is responsive to the 
needs of the public, and that accidents of far smaller size (than 
TMI) could be designated extraordinary nuclear occurrences in 
conformity with the legislative intent of the Price-Anderson Act 
as amended.81 The Commission has not yet ruled on the peti-
tion. There is apparently some feeling among the NRC commis-
sioners themselves that the threshold criteria should be re-
viewed, but that opinion does not seem to be shared by a 
majority.82 
In response to the NRC's notice of its intention to undertake 
an extraordinary nuclear occurrence determination for the TMI 
accident, the Commission received considerable comment that 
the criteria were inadequate or unreasonable.88 The NRC Staff 
Panel's defense of the criteria was not convincing, relying largely 
on the lack of complaints prior to the TMI accident. Signifi-
cantly, the Commission inadvertently admitted that the criteria 
were based upon outdated radiation standards." 
Administrative action to lower the criteria for the threshold is 
advisable in the absence of other reform. The NRC could lower 
the quantitative criteria for an extraordinary nuclear occurrence 
by administrative rulemaking. 811 Such a change would reduce the 
potential mischief of the threshold to the extent that it only ex-
cluded minimal accidents from the waiver scheme.88 However, 
the statutory language requiring "substantial" radiation levels 
and damages87 would seem to constrain the Commission from 
•• Id. at 50,420. 
•• See Metropolitan Edison Co., 11 N.R.C. 519, 522 & n.1 (1980) ("Indeed, we have 
some reservations about the criteria and the statutory definition of an ENO in light of 
the Three Mile Island experience") (footnote that one commissioner believes that the 
criteria reflect "an outdated and overly relaxed view of the level of acceptable radiation 
dosages"). 
83 STAFF ENO REPORT, supra note 54, app. C, at 11, 15-16. 
.. The Staff Panel expressly declined to address the question whether the criteria 
should be changed, id. at 2, but responded to the attacks on the criteria by stating that 
they 
were established in 1967 and 1968 consistent with then - current standards 
contained in Federal Radiation Council protective action guides. The criteria 
were established in the course of public rule malting whereby members of the 
public and other interested parties had the opportunity to comment. The ade-
quacy or reasonableness of the criteria had never been questioned after enact-
ment of the rules in part because there had never been, before TMI, an occasion 
to implement the criteria. 
Id. at 15. 
ea Metropolitan Edison Co., 11 N.R.C. 519, 530 (1980). 
88 See notes 77-81 and accompanying text supra. 
•• See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1976). 
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going far enough to accomplish the reform that is needed. More 
importantly, because other fundamental changes are appropriate 
to give substance to the public protection promise of the waiver 
of defenses provisions, a more drastic legislative remedy is called 
for. 
B. Arguments for Abolition 
The extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold so defeats 
the rationale of the waiver provisions that Congress should abol-
ish the threshold from the Price-Anderson Act. For one, the 
Three Mile Island incident calls into question a basic premise of 
the threshold, that claims arising from less serious accidents are 
less meritorious, and the ref ore less deserving of the protections 
provided by the waivers. There is no logical relationship between 
the severity of a nuclear incident and the merit of an individual 
claim resulting therefrom. 88 If the claimant can demonstrate 
that he or she has suffered loss and that the loss was caused by 
the nuclear incident, recovery should not depend on how much 
radiation was released or how much total damage was caused. 
Although the threshold does not deny victims of lesser acci-
dents any rights they would otherwise have under tort law, it 
denies them rights accorded to victims of extraordinary nuclear 
occurrences on the basis of a classification (severity of the acci-
dent) not rationally related to the articulated congressional pur-
pose of excluding unmeritorious claims. 89 Although this irration-
18 Harvard University Professor John G. Palfrey, who had recently resigned as an 
AEC Commissioner, testified at the 1966 Waiver Hearings: 
I wonder about justifying the difference in treatment of claimants by the size of 
the accident. 
Where the statute of limitations is concerned, the more liberal provisions are 
required by the fact that a delayed manifestation is typical of some radiation 
injuries, which has nothing to do with the size of the accident. 
. . . It seems unfair to have the burden of litigation shift so sharply depending 
on which side of the line the occurrence is on, particularly if this is not related to 
the extent of any individual claimant's injury. 
Waiver Hearings, supra note 22, at 272. 
Similarly, Richard D. Kahn, of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, submitted a statement that alluded to this logical 
discrepancy in the threshold concept: "[l]t is arguable that the real need for waivers is 
not in the major nuclear incident but rather in the case of a low-level exposure ... 
where the claimant may not discover he has been injured until after the state statute of 
limitations has run." Id. at 283. 
" The irrationality of the classification achieved by the threshold in relation to the 
congressional purpose might constitute a denial of equal protection under the Fifth 
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ality may not rise to the level of an equal protection violation, 
critics have questioned the fairness and rationality of such dif-
ferentiation of treatment of claimants on policy grounds.90 
Secondly, the threshold contravenes another congressional 
purpose of the waiver scheme - mitigating legal uncertainties.91 
The uncertainties caused by varying defenses that licensees 
might have in different states are replaced under the threshold 
requirement by a more substantial uncertainty: whether those 
defenses will have to be waived under the Act. Until a determi-
nation is authoritatively made as to whether the accident was an 
extraordinary nuclear occurence, claimants may not know 
whether they will have to prove negligence, how long they will 
have to file their claims, or in which court they should be filed. 
In the only experience to date, the NRC took more than a year 
to make that determination. 92 
Amendment. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (holding a legislative clas-
sification whose stated purpose was prevention of spurious claims to be an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection); Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on 
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. RBv. 1 (1972). 
The liability limit of the Act was attacked on equal protection as well as due process 
grounds in Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Comm., 431 F. Supp. 203 (W.D.N.C. 1977). The court held that the $560 million liability 
limit in the Price-Anderson Act was constitutionally defective in three respects: (1) the 
amount of the limit was not rationally related to potential losses from nuclear accidents; 
(2) the liability limit irrationally encouraged irresponsibility among nuclear plant build-
ers and owners; and (3) the Act abolished state tort law remedies without providing pro-
tential nuclear victims with a quid pro quo. Id. at 222-24. The court also held that equal 
protection was lacking because the burden of nuclear damages exceeding $560 million 
was on people chosen without ,ational relation to the Act's purposes. Id. at 224-25. 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed unanimously. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina En-
vironmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). The Court rejected each of the dis-
trict court's three due process holdings, and suggested also that the Act did not deny 
equal protection. The Court held: (1) the liability limit is not irrational, since Congress, 
to promote the nuclear industry had to choose some figure for maximum liability and the 
Court deferred to Congress' judgment concerning the actual amount; (2) the limit does 
not encourage irresponsibility, since nuclear safety is supposed to be ensured by inde-
pendent regulation; (3) the assurance of a $560 million fund is a reasonably just substi-
tute, and therefore an adequate quid pro quo, for the common law rights abrogated by 
the Act. The Court assumed arguendo that a quid pro quo was necessary, but expressly 
refused to hold that it was. Id. at 86-89. Although the equal protection argument was not 
pursued on appeal, the Court said that any classification which establishes a liability 
limit was rationally related to the promotion of the nuclear industry. Id. at 93-94. See 
generally Dickerson, Limited Liability for Nuclear Accidents: Duke Power Co. v. Caro· 
lina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 163, 167-68 (1979). 
The constitutionality of the extr~ordinary nuclear occurrence threshold is beyond the 
scope of this article, which scrutinizes the concept on policy grounds. The irrationality 
which might make the threshold unconstitutional certainly makes it bad policy, apart 
from any decision by the Supreme Court on its constitutional status. 
00 See note 88 supra. 
01 H.R. REP. No. 2043, supra note 23, at 6-7. 
"" See note 76 supra. 
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The Three Mile Island incident also demonstrates the poten-
tial inadequacy of the twenty-year gross statute of limitations 
provided by the waivers. If a statistically significant number of 
additional cancers were not to appear among the population ex-
posed to radiation until more than twenty years after the acci-
dent, the claims of the victims might well be barred by the stat-
ute of limitations. The logic and fundamental fairness of the 
discovery rule apply equally to claimants on both sides of an ar-
bitrary twenty-year line, and easily outweigh the interests of de-
fendants in repose from "stale" claims.98 
Moreover, the threshold is unnecessary. One of the central ra-
tionales originally offered for the threshold was the elimination 
of "nuisance suits."94 Critics of the threshold, however, have ef-
fectively debunked the need for the threshold as a screen against 
nuisance suits. As several witnesses pointed out at the hearings 
prior to passage of the 1966 amendments, the problems that vic-
tims of low-level radiation exposures would face in proving dam-
ages and causation - elements not affected by the statutory 
waivers - would provide more than adequate protection against 
frivolous claims. 911 
The contention that the causation hurdle would provide more 
than enough protection against frivolous claims was never ade-
quately answered by supporters of the threshold concept. 96 This 
•• See Birnbaum, supra note 30. 
04 See note 46 supra. 
" This point was forcefully made by Columbia University Law Professor Arthur W. 
Murphy, who testified: 
If, as we are assured, the intent of the bill is to exclude only nuisance claims, I 
wonder whether the game is worth the candle. 
[l]t is still not clear that juries or courts, if properly advised and intelligently 
briefed, will have any great difficulty in separating the spurious from the real 
claim solely on the basis of the existence of legal causation. 
The danger of the present wording of the statute is, of course, that a number 
of meritorious claims will go down the drain with the nuisance claims despite the 
protestations of all concerned that that is not their intent. 
Waiver Hearings, supra note 22, at 68-69. 
Another participant stated: 
The apparent justification for the "extraordinary" concept is the avoidance of 
"nuisance" suits. This justification gives little weight to the already formidable 
burden carried by claimants in proving causation. . . . [l]t is doubtful whether 
waivers of "fault" will really encourage fictitious claims in light of the "causa-
tion" hurdle .... [I]t is true that a shorter period of limitations may reduce the 
number of suits brought, but statutes of limitations do not discriminate between 
legitimate and "nuisance" claims. 
Id. at 283 (statement of Richard D. Kahn). 
" Asked why the waivers should not apply to any nuclear incident, Walter A. Hamil-
ton, vice president of United Nuclear Corp., answered: "You would certainly open the 
door to what are called nuisance suits ... . "Id.at 57. When it was pointed out that the 
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failure is significant since the causation problems related to radi-
ation injury in general, and especially low-level radiation, are pe-
culiarly severe. It is impossible to prove that a particular case of 
cancer was caused by a particular exposure to radiation. The 
only way a causal connection between the exposure and the dis-
ease can be shown is by a statistical increase in the incidence of 
the disease among those who were known to be exposed. 97 Such 
a showing will be very difficult where the radiation exposure is 
low. 
Finally, the threshold determination itself may exert undue 
pressure on claimants and defendants in litigation. If the NRC 
officially determines that an accident is not an extraordinary nu-
clear occurrence, defendants obtain an undeserved psychological 
bargaining chip in settlement negotiations. The NRC finding 
could also influence a jury on the merits. Conversely, a positive 
determination would give the claimants an undeserved advan-
tage in terms of the actual merits of their claims. Thus, the 
threshold's irrational connection between overall severity of the 
accident and the merit of inidividual claims can adversely effect 
the outcome of claims even where application of the waivers is 
not critical. 
C. Future Directions 
For the reasons above, Congress should abolish the concept 
of the extraordinary nuclear occurrence from the Price-Ander-
son Act. At the same time, some standard for the application of 
the waiver provisions is required. The following recommenda-
tions point out the possible contours of reform. 
1. Create a "nuclear incident" standard- One likely reform 
would be to institute a standard which would apply the waivers 
of defenses to all "nuclear incidents."98 The effect would be to 
replace the current, unreasonably high threshold with a mini-
mal, flexible one, determined judicially rather than administra-
claimant would have to prove causation, he responded: "I think you change the temper 
of the situation if you extend it too broadly. It has a very valuable meaning if you re-
strict it to special situations." Id. at 58. Unfortunately, the Committee members did not 
press Mr. Hamilton to elaborate, and that cryptic comment was the best response that 
was offered to this incisive criticism of the need for the threshold. The same conclusion 
was reached in Note, supra note 12, at 381. 
"" See, e.g., Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach 
to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 266-67 (1960). 
08 
"Nuclear incident" is defined in the Price-Anderson Act at 42 U.S.C. § 20i4(q) 
(1976). See note 36 supra. 
SPRING 1981] Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence 629 
tively. This judicially determined definition of nuclear incident 
should include loss of use of property, and expenses and income 
loss arising from objectively reasonable actions taken to avoid 
exposure to radioactivity. This would guarantee that the waivers 
would apply to any accident involving reasonable evacuations, a 
finding within the competence of the courts. 
2. Replace the twenty-year statute of limitations with a dis-
covery rule- More adequate protection of the public calls for at 
least one amendment to the waiver provisions themselves. The 
twenty-year gross statute of limitations should be repealed, so 
that the "three years from time of discovery of injury" rule re-
mains applicable indefinitely. Because many radiation injuries 
can have latency periods longer than twenty years, and genetic 
defects can take several generations to appear, the present pro-
vision is no help to the victims of those injuries. 
3. Create additional waivers- If Congress wishes to demon-
strate genuine concern for protection of the public from nuclear 
technology, it should consider the addition of more substantive 
waivers to the present ones. For example, if licensees were re-
quired to waive any issues or defenses as to the compensability 
of certain damages not always allowed under tort law, the 
scheme would more equitably allocate the true social costs of 
nuclear accidents. Examples of these damages include evacua-
tion expenses, lost income, lost business revenue, decline in 
property values, health monitoring costs, severe psychological 
distress, loss of peaceful use and enjoyment of property, and 
other consequential and incidental injuries. State tort laws have 
widely disparate standards for compensability of such damages. 
The Act would be greatly improved if it mitigated the disparate 
effects by ensuring the compensability of those damages as long 
as the claimants can prove actual harm and causation. The diffi-
culties of proof .will be more than adequate to dispose of unmer-
itorious claims. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of waiver of defenses is a step toward improving 
the public protection component of the Price-Anderson Act, but 
the extraordinary nuclear occurrence threshold tends to make 
the promise of protection largely illusory for an important class 
of accident victims. To the extent that future accidents cause 
substantial economic dislocation without heavy physical damage, 
the threshold creates a substantial gap in protection of the pub-
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lie. The threshold should be abolished because it is superfluous 
as a screen against frivolous claims, excessively broad in its ap-
plication, and a source of needless uncertainty and complexity in 
administration. Additionally, Congress should repeal the twenty-
year limit on waiver of statute of limitation defenses, so that vic-
tims of nuclear incidents are not unfairly precluded from receiv-
ing compensation for their injuries. 
-Dean R. Tousley 
